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$EVWUDFW
An important feature of the Protocol concluded in Kyoto, Japan, in December 1997 is the
differentiation of the climate targets of the industrialized countries. A more systematic
approach to burden sharing than that leading to the Kyoto Protocol could help negotiating
targets after 2012, and when including developing countries in the group of countries with
climate targets at a later stage.
The article discusses a number of concepts of equity, examines three specific burden sharing
rules and formulae, and presents cost calculations on the burden sharing rules. The three
formulae that are explored have some ability to adapt to national circumstances, but none of
them creates a burden sharing arrangement that completely equalizes the national income
losses as percentage of GDP across the OECD. Nonetheless, the results show that burden
sharing rules can be useful tools and provide some, but not all, of the guiding framework for
climate policy negotiations.
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 ,QWURGXFWLRQ
An important feature of the Protocol concluded in Kyoto, Japan, in December 1997 is the
differentiation of the climate targets of the industrialized countries, the so-called Annex B
countries listed in the Protocol.1 The differentiated Kyoto targets partly reflect some of the
significant dissimilarities and asymmetries existing across the Annex B countries, and the
Kyoto protocol may set a significant precedence for climate target negotiations in the future.
In fact, post-Kyoto it seems likely that future attempts to renegotiate and strengthen the
climate targets of Annex B countries will have to differentiate targets across Annex B
countries. Differentiation of targets will probably also be important when negotiations to
include developing countries in the group of countries with climate targets are undertaken at a
later stage.
Not surprisingly, the achievement of ‘fair’ burden sharing among OECD countries became a
key issue in the climate protocol negotiations from 1995 to 1997.2 Some suggested that all
OECD countries should cut greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by the same percentage, or that
the OECD countries should stabilize their emission levels in some future year relative to their
emissions in a specific base year.
Others however, notably Australia, France, Iceland, Japan, Norway and Switzerland, were
opposed to non-differentiated, across-the-board approaches that presumably would place an
unfair economic burden on them.3 They insisted that a future climate protocol should
differentiate among OECD countries so that certain countries would not incur abatement costs
that were more burdensome than those incurred by others. OECD countries differ in terms of
GHG abatement costs, energy efficiency, GHG emissions rates, wealth, population, resource
endowments and in other ways as well, and the countries supporting differentiation
emphasized that such dissimilarities should be dealt with systematically.
To help the creation of a fair differentiation regime, some suggested developing burden
sharing rules. Indicators for differentiation were never seriously discussed during the protocol
negotiations, but some countries nonetheless proposed to differentiate between industrialized
countries and so-called economies in transition (EIT).4 With respect to differentiation within
the OECD group, Norway suggested to use emissions per capita, emission intensity of GDP,
and level of economic development as basic criteria.5
                                                
1
 The Annex B countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, European Community, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States of America.
2
 Whereas a number of studies have examined the general issue of fairness in the area of international climate
policy, relatively few studies have looked at fairness among OECD countries. For a ‘North-South’ perspective on
fairness, see Shue (1992). See also Harris (1996). For a good overview of equity principles and approaches to
burden sharing, see Grubb et al. (1992). Ten studies in climate policy and burden sharing are reviewed in
Ringius, Torvanger and Meze (1996).
3
 France submitted its own proposal before the common EU position was established.
4
 For summary of proposals made by a number of countries, see United Nations, Framework Convention on
Climate Change (1996).
5‘Submission by Norway’. 16 October 1996.
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The burden sharing rule proposed by Norway is almost identical to Formula I examined in this
article.6 An Australian proposal identified five criteria for burden sharing – projected
population growth, GDP per capita growth, emission intensity of GDP, emission intensity of
exports, and fossil-fuel intensity of exports – but made it clear that countries could suggest
additional criteria.7 Apart from emission intensity of exports and fossil-fuel intensity of
exports, the proposals of Norway and Australia contained a number of similar features.8 Other
countries, however, especially the United States and Germany, made it explicit that they
feared that establishing burden sharing rules would complicate and jeopardize the protocol
negotiations.9
The differentiation in the Kyoto Protocol was hammered out under extreme time pressure
during the last negotiation round in Kyoto. These negotiations were not guided by or informed
by a particular burden sharing rule or fairness principle; rather, an acceptable climate package
deal was constructed after a series of negotiations on single issues.10 However, the Kyoto
Protocol marks a definite shift in policy issues from ‘What is the likelihood of differentiated
climate targets?’ to ‘What are the most appropriate ways to differentiate climate targets?’
In this article we explore burden sharing rules, also called formulae, and indicate the
distributive effects of their implementation. We compare three different burden sharing rules
and examine how they would distribute abatement costs across OECD countries, calculated as
national income losses from emission reductions. The targets indicate which national
circumstances are important when a country’s share of emission reduction is determined by
each of the formulae. We primarily focus on the achievement of horizontal equity. The
principle of horizontal equity calls for all persons in the same group to be treated equally. In
the context of climate target negotiations it would imply the equalization of per capita national
income losses across OECD countries or an equal percentage reduction in welfare (e.g.
measured as gross domestic product).
First we review the literature on burden sharing related to climate policy agreements and
describe a number of equity principles. Then we examine the way in which the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol address the
issues of equity and burden sharing. After that, we show how the three different types of
burden sharing rules would differentiate targets across the OECD. In addition, we use a
numerical economic model to calculate the way in which the rules distribute national income
losses across the OECD, making the simplifying assumptions that only CO2 is included in the
                                                
6
 The Norwegian burden sharing rule is based on the report Torvanger et al. (1996). The burden sharing formulae
in this paper are based on this report. Formula I includes a GDP indicator which is left out in the Norwegian
proposal. See also ETSAP (1997) for an evaluation of the Norwegian burden sharing rule compared to the
alternative strategies ‘uniform carbon tax’ and ‘individual stabilization’.
7
 ‘Further Submission by Australia’. 15 January 1997.
8
 Australia’s negotiation approach was somewhat different from the approach taken by Norway. Australia argued,
without explicitly referring to the Norwegian proposal, that ‘because of variations in the importance of indicators
for individual parties, the application of indicators in a systematic process of negotiation, rather than by a
mathematical construct, offers the most realistic and achievable means of arriving at a set of differentiated
commitments which meet the governing equity principle [‘equal percentage changes in per capita economic
welfare’]. ‘Further Submission from Australia’. 15 January 1997, Article 4(b).
9
 See statement by Cornelia Quennet-Thielen, German Delegation. 6 March 1996. In Kyoto, however, the US
accepted the differentiation of climate targets.
10
 For the negotiations on differentiation at the Kyoto conference, see (DUWK1HJRWLDWLRQV%XOOHWLQ (1997).
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agreement and that the national quotas are non-tradable. In the final section we discuss the
usefulness of the three burden sharing rules and the prospects for creating rules that will be
satisfactory and useful in international climate negotiations. We conclude that burden sharing
rules will be a useful tool in climate negotiations. However, it is unlikely that differentiated
climate targets will be based on such rules alone. Political considerations and other factors
will also influence international climate target differentiation.
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 /LWHUDWXUHUHYLHZ
The literature on burden sharing in the context of international climate policy agreements is of
a rather recent date. The first contributions have addressed the burden sharing issue in the
context of allocating carbon entitlements or quotas among countries, whereas more recent
contributions analyze target differentiation.
Rose (1992) presents a thorough examination of ten international equity principles. The
principles are used to allocate carbon entitlements with and without trading to eight major
countries and world regions. Both static reference bases and dynamic reference bases taking
into account cumulative emissions are employed. Alternative equity principles are shown to
lead to widely different welfare implications for the world regions. Trading reduces these
differences significantly.
Barrett (1992) observes that ethical rules often serve as focal points when negotiating
international agreements. He presents a brief overview of thirteen allocation rules for tradable
carbon emission entitlements, before undertaking an analysis in a game-theoretic framework
of outcomes for the United States, the Soviet Union, China and rest of the world. A ‘Kantian’
rule, where countries choose abatement levels at least as high as the uniform abatement level
they would like all countries to observe, is also explored. This rule outperforms all other rules,
and the outcomes come close to the cooperative solution, and all countries are better off than
in the case of no agreement.
Ridgley (1996) describes an approach to find the ‘relative accountability’ of multinational
regions for reducing GHG emissions. Various approaches are discussed and divided into
indices and target based approaches, on the one hand, and equity based approaches, on the
other. Next, a survey of multiple criteria decision making methods is presented in which the
methods are divided into principle or performance based methods, and interactive or non-
interactive methods. Such methods are seen as having a high potential for developing
compromise burden sharing schemes. The author illustrates the multiple criteria methodology
by defining eleven equity indicators and combining them by employing a lexicographic
optimization method. The resulting accountability profile over the eleven multinational
regions produces a high degree of fairness.
The point of departure for Kawashima (1996) is differentiation of targets for the Annex I
countries (i.e. industrialized countries) defined in the FCCC. As the first step she determines
CO2 ‘emission needs’ based on the three countries with lowest emissions. A population based
rule, a GDP based rule, and a multi-criteria rule (population, GDP, carbon intensity,
temperature and area) specifying five sectors are examined. In the second step the emission
baselines developed in the first step are employed to set targets. One alternative is to set
targets in proportion to the emission baselines. The other alternative is to set targets in
proportion to the difference between actual emissions and the baseline. The main finding is
that the multi-criteria rule yields less difference between the smallest and largest target for a
country than single-criterion rules.
Rose et al. (1997) analyze alternative equity criteria for global warming policy. The criteria
are divided into allocation-based, outcome-based and process-based criteria. By employing a
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nonlinear programming model they examine the welfare implications of the alternative criteria
for major world regions. The results indicate that the net abatement cost is similar for several
criteria. However, criteria such as the egalitarian principle and consensus equity show rather
extreme outcomes.
Rowlands (1997) examines rules for the allocation of GHG emissions among OECD
countries. The rules are divided into six categories according to the relevance of historical
emissions (i.e. reactive historical, proactive historical, and ahistorical) and emphasis on
equality or efficiency. After calculating the emission reductions generated for each country
and rule, he concludes that the rules produce very different results for the various OECD
countries. Finally he proposes a twin-track strategy, consisting of flat-rate targets in the short
term and a differentiated approach in the longer term.
Finally, the European Union (EU) followed a so-called Triptych approach in its internal pre-
Kyoto negotiations on differentiated member states’ targets (Blok, Phylipsen and Bode, 1997).
This ‘bottom-up’ approach separated the member state economies into three broad economic
sectors; the domestic sector, the heavy industrial sector, and the electricity generation sector,
respectively.11 National obligations for the member states were calculated by adding up
individual allowances for each of the three sectors and by taking into account economic
growth, population changes and climate-adjusted energy use.12 The sectoral allowances would
not be regarded as sectoral targets themselves.
A per capita approach was used to calculate emission allowances in the domestic sector. The
Triptych Approach assumed that these emissions would converge to the same level in the year
2030 in the member states, and that emissions allowances per head should be identical in all
EU member states in 2030. Energy efficiency improvement targets were established for heavy
industry.  The largest differences existed in the electricity sector where a tailor-made
approach, combining a country-to-country approach and general guidelines, was followed.
                                                
11
 The domestic sector was defined as including households, services, light industry, agriculture, and
transportation. The heavy industrial sector consisted of the following industries: building materials, chemical,
iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, pulp and paper, refineries, coke ovens (if they were not a part of the iron and
steel industry), gasworks and other energy transformation branches, electricity generation excluded.
12
 In March 1997, agreement was reached on the following targets: Belgium (-10%); Denmark (-25%); Germany
(-25%); Greece (+30%); Spain (+17%); France (0%); Ireland (+15%); Italy (-7%); Luxembourg (-30%); the
Netherlands (-10%); Austria (-25%); Portugal (+40%); Finland (0%); Sweden (+5%), and the UK (-10%). These
targets were formulated as changes in emissions of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide in 2010,
compared to 1990 emission levels. After the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol these targets were re-negotiated in
June 1998. Targets for countries with emission reductions were lowered, whereas countries with emission
increases got targets implying smaller emission increases. The UK was the only country to accept a higher target.
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 (TXLW\SULQFLSOHVDQGEXUGHQVKDULQJUXOHV
This section briefly reviews those concepts or principles of equity that are most likely to be
relevant and influential in post-Kyoto policy discussions on climate target differentiation.
There is no commonly accepted definition of equity. Equity principles refer to more general
concepts of distributive justice or fairness.13 As already mentioned, statements made by
countries during the protocol negotiations indicated that they were concerned about
achievement of fairness and equity, and showed that equity principles served as a benchmark
against which countries evaluated and compared their GHG reduction commitments.
Equity principles should be distinguished from specific burden sharing rules or formulae, and
from criteria or indicators. A distinction based on level of generality can be drawn between i)
equity principles, ii) burden sharing formulae or rules, and iii) criteria or indicators. Equity
principles refer to more general justice and fairness principles and can be operationalized by
linking them to rules or formulae. Burden sharing formulae or rules are operational functions
that generate a specific burden sharing scheme given input from one or more criteria or
indicators.
A formula defines ‘national emissions entitlements, or changes from the status quo, on the
basis of national characteristics such as population, GNP, current emissions, or factors
plausibly associated with national responsibility, sensitivity, or need for various emitting
activities’.14 Thus such formulae or rules must both specify the relevant criteria and how these
criteria should be combined. Criteria and indicators contribute ‘hard’ data, for example CO2
emissions per capita and GDP per capita.
7DEOH6HOHFWHGHTXLW\SULQFLSOHVDQGUHODWHGEXUGHQVKDULQJUXOHV
(TXLW\SULQFLSOH ,QWHUSUHWDWLRQ ([DPSOHRILPSOLHGEXUGHQVKDULQJUXOH
Egalitarian Equal rights of people to use
the atmospheric resources
Reduce emissions in proportion to population or
equal per capita emissions
Sovereignty Current rate of emissions
constitutes a status quo right
now
Reduce emissions proportionally across all
countries to maintain relative emission levels
between them
Horizontal Similar economic
circumstances have similar
emission rights and burden
sharing responsibilities
Equalize net welfare change across countries (net
cost of abatement as a proportion of GDP is the
same for each country)
Vertical The greater the ability to pay
the greater the economic
burden
Net cost of abatement is positively correlated
with per person GDP
Polluter pays Carry abatement burden
corresponding to emissions
(eventually including
historical emissions)
Share abatement costs across countries in
proportion to emission levels
Sources: Rose (1992), ABARE and DFAT (1995), Bureau of Industry Economics (1995), Burtraw and Toman
(1992).
                                                
13
 Rose (1992).
14
 Parson and Zeckhauser (1995), 99.
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A number of principles of fairness and equity have been identified as relevant in the broader
context of global climate change. The most prominent principles are summarized in Table 1.15
The egalitarian principle - ‘the principle of equal rights etc. for all persons’ - is concerned
with equality.16 In the context of global climate change, the principle would imply that every
individual has the same right to use the atmosphere and should be allowed the same right to
emit greenhouse gases. This principle would mean that targets would be set in proportion to
population. Similarly, emission permits would be distributed to individuals, not governments,
and each individual would be entitled to the same amount of permits.
The sovereignty principle implies that each individual, or entity, is guaranteed some rights and
resources. The principle of sovereignty is commonly observed in international environmental
treaty-making and institution-building, and is adopted in the FCCC.17 One way to interpret the
sovereignty principle is reducing GHG emissions in proportion to given or existing emissions.
It is also possible to interpret the sovereignty principle to mean equal percentage emission
reductions in all countries, e.g. countries reduce their emissions by 10% in 2010 compared to
the 1990 level, or another across-the-board policy.
The principle of horizontal equity, which calls for all persons in the same group to be treated
equally, resembles to some degree the principle of sovereignty. The principle of horizontal
equity implies equal treatment of the members that belong to a group. It is quite clear that this
was the most influential equity principle in the climate protocol negotiations among OECD
countries. The principle would require the equalization of the burdens of abatement cost
across nations, or an equal percentage reduction in welfare.
Vertical equity is intended to make improvement for those with fewer resources relative to
those with more resources. Progressive income taxation is a well-known example of
application of the principle of vertical equity. There exist many such examples of use of the
vertical principle, but there is no obvious or clear-cut set of rules to follow when dividing
individual countries into different groups, and specific rules may be somewhat arbitrary.
Vertical equity refers to the ability to pay and implies greater economic burden to be carried
by richer countries. It is by now a well-known principle of international environmental law.18
The polluter pays principle implies that the burden is distributed in accordance with an
individual’s contribution of emissions. The amount to be paid by polluters increases as
                                                
15
 An additional distinction can be drawn between procedural fairness, i.e. whether all countries are able to
participate effectively in the climate change negotiations, and consequential fairness of allocation, i.e. whether
the outcome of the global climate policy process is considered fair. The above does not examine procedural
equity. For a summary discussion of procedural equity, see, for example, Bruce, Lee and Haites (1996), 85-86
and 116-118.
16
 Oxford University Press (1982).
17
 According to one of the FCCC’s preambles: ‘States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction
or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction’.
18
 For example, the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer distinguishes between
developed and developing countries. Because of their ‘basic domestic needs’, the latter group is entitled to delay
its compliance with the control measures specified in this protocol by ten years. In effect, a transition period is
allowed for developing countries in order to lessen the burden imposed on them. See Benedick (1991).
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emission levels rise.19 One example of applying this principle in a burden sharing formula
would be to make the burden proportional to carbon dioxide emissions or by taxing the carbon
content of fossil fuels.
Burden sharing rules will necessarily have to be developed through an international
negotiation process. Rules and formulae would identify individual countries’ emission
entitlements or their amount of emission reduction. Some equity principles could be
consistent with more than one burden sharing rule, and particular rules or formulae could be
consistent with more than one equity principle.20 For example, a population based rule
assigning reduction targets or emission permits on a per capita basis would be consistent with
the egalitarian principle with its equal per person emissions and with the sovereignty principle
if emissions are cut back proportionally on a per capita basis.
Some burden sharing rules might be more operational than other rules. Rules might be static
and focus on one point in time, for example, population or land area, or they might be more
dynamic, indicating cumulative emissions, development, future growth rates, etc. Rules can
use a single criterion, such as population, GDP or abatement costs, or can combine different
criteria, e.g. emissions per capita or abatement costs as a percentage of GDP.
A recent theme among analysts is to examine in what ways several combined criteria could be
incorporated into a single multi-criteria burden sharing rule. A significant advantage of multi-
criteria rules over single-criterion rules is that they are more ‘robust’ in the sense that they
yield less difference between the smallest and largest target for a country.21 They are less
sensitive to peculiar circumstances in individual countries. Rules may be expressed in
absolute terms, for example reduction of emissions by 20% compared to the 1990 levels, or in
relative terms, for example uniform percentage abatement per capita or equal emissions per
unit of GDP. They may also be expressed in marginal terms, for example equal marginal
abatement cost.
Our three formulae for allocating emission reductions incorporate both allocation-based and
outcome-based equity principles.22 CO2 emissions per capita reflect the sovereignty and the
polluter pays principles, and the GDP per capita criterion reflects the vertical equity principle.
Our aim of equalizing national income losses as a proportion of GDP across OECD countries
reflects an outcome-based equity principle. CO2 emissions per unit of GDP, which is as an
indicator for energy efficiency, are included in Formula I and Formula III. A distinguishing
feature of our study is that we calculate national income loss estimates for all OECD countries
for the three different burden sharing multi-criteria formulae (and variants of these putting
different weights on the specific indicators).
                                                
19
 For discussion, see Grubb (1995), 490.
20
 Rose (1992).
21
 See Kawashima (1996).
22
 For a discussion of various principles, see Rose et al. (1997).
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 %XUGHQVKDULQJDQLPSRUWDQWLVVXHLQWKH
.\RWR3URWRFRO
A significant outcome of the 1995 Berlin Conference of the Parties to the FCCC was
agreement on a mandate for further negotiations.23 The Berlin mandate initiated a process
aimed at elaborating policies and measures and setting quantified emissions limitation and
reduction objectives (QELROs) for developed countries over specified time-frames such as
2005, 2010 and 2020. As proposed by the Berlin Conference, strengthened commitments of
developed countries were adopted in form of a protocol by the third Conference of the Parties
in Kyoto, Japan, in December 1997.
Some studies done before Berlin had indicated that abatement costs would fall unequally on
OECD countries in case a climate protocol inadequately reflected important dissimilarities
among countries. For example, it was estimated that Australia would experience an annual loss
of 0.79% in Net Domestic Product from stabilizing its own CO2 emissions at the 1990 level,
while the EU would only suffer a loss of 0.19%.24
It was quite clear that such possible inequalities could create a serious obstacle to reaching
agreement on a protocol. As the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) noted:
µ$OWKRXJKWKHUHVXOWVRIDQ\VSHFLILFPRGHOLQJVWXGLHVQHHGWREHWUHDWHGZLWKFDXWLRQEHFDXVHRI
WKHLQKHUHQWXQFHUWDLQWLHVDQGVFRSHIRUELDVLQJDVVXPSWLRQVWRZDUGVQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWVWKHUHLV
QRGRXEWWKDWWKHUHDUHFRPSOH[LVVXHVRIIDLUEXUGHQVKDULQJDPRQJ2(&'FRXQWULHVWKDWWKH
QH[WVWDJHLQQHJRWLDWLRQZLOOKDYHWRVWDUWDGGUHVVLQJ¶.25
The Kyoto Protocol identifies several equity principles that might play a role in future
differentiation processes among the OECD countries. First and foremost, however, it
distinguishes explicitly between developed and developing countries. It refers to the FCCC in
which it is underlined that full consideration should be given to ‘the specific needs and special
circumstances of developing country Parties’.26
The Protocol underlines, in reference to FCCC Article 3.2., that full consideration should be
given to ‘Parties that would have to bear a GLVSURSRUWLRQDWHRUDEQRUPDOEXUGHQ under the
Convention’.27 Pursuant to Protocol Article 2.3 (which refers to the FCCC):
µ7KH3DUWLHVVKRXOGSURWHFWWKHFOLPDWHV\VWHPIRUWKHEHQHILWRISUHVHQWDQGIXWXUH
JHQHUDWLRQVRIKXPDQNLQGRQWKHEDVLVRIHTXLW\DQGLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHLUFRPPRQEXW
GLIIHUHQWLDWHGUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVDQGUHVSHFWLYHFDSDELOLWLHV$FFRUGLQJO\WKHGHYHORSHGFRXQWU\
3DUWLHVVKRXOGWDNHWKHOHDGLQFRPEDWLQJFOLPDWHFKDQJHDQGWKHDGYHUVHHIIHFWVWKHUHRI¶.28
                                                
23
 United Nations, Framework Convention on Climate Change (1995).
24
 Chisholm and Moran (1994), 6. See also ABARE  and DFAT (1995).
25
 Bruce, Lee, and Haites (1996), 104.
26
 FCCC, article 3.2.
27
 FCCC, article 3.2. (Italics added).
28
 FCCC, article 3.1. (Italics added).
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Consequently, countries should take into account the principle of intergenerational equity, and
they should furthermore acknowledge their difference in regards to ability to pay. Thus the
Kyoto Protocol underscores the significance of the achievement of vertical equity, especially
between developed and developing countries.
Following the Protocol, when OECD countries implement policies and measures, they should
do this in such a way that these ‘minimize adverse (…) effects on international trade, and
social, environmental and economic impacts on other Parties’.29 A reference is also made to
FCCC Article 4.8, according to which it is necessary to pay attention to, among other things,
impacts on:
µ&RXQWULHVZKRVHHFRQRPLHVDUHKLJKO\GHSHQGHQWRQLQFRPHJHQHUDWHGIURPWKHSURGXFWLRQ
SURFHVVLQJDQGH[SRUWDQGRURQFRQVXPSWLRQRIIRVVLOIXHOVDQGDVVRFLDWHGHQHUJ\LQWHQVLYH
SURGXFWV¶30
The Berlin mandate underscored also the significance of the achievement of equity among
OECD countries. It underlined that individual circumstances of developed countries and
differences in starting points should be taken into account when strengthening commitments
to reduce GHG emissions and it implicitly adopted the principle of horizontal equity.31
However, the Berlin Mandate did not specify in detail which national circumstances should be
taken into consideration or whether this should or could be done in the form of specific
burden sharing rules or formulae.
To conclude, the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol stress fair burden sharing as an important
issue. At the general level, they separate the issue of the achievement of equity among OECD
countries from the issue of the achievement of equity between developed and developing
countries. Horizontal equity seems the most relevant equity principle in the OECD context,
but neither this nor any other principle has yet been made operational in the form of specific
burden sharing rules or formulae.
The FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol lack rules and mechanisms for achieving equity in the
sense of sharing income losses equally amongst countries with a similar ability to pay. It is
therefore useful to test burden sharing rules for the OECD countries, a group of relatively
comparable countries. As well, they clearly are the most likely candidates for climate
commitments.
The EIT countries, which constitute a quite different group of countries, are not examined in
this article since they are expected to take on a smaller burden then the OECD countries.
Targets are allocated to the EIT countries under the Kyoto Protocol but, due to lowered
emissions during the period of economic restructuring since 1990, the related costs are likely
to be smaller than the costs to OECD countries. Moreover, the largest countries in the group,
Russia and Ukraine, have very generous targets since they in 2008-2012 can emit the same
volume of GHGs as in 1990. In addition, EIT countries are allowed some additional flexibility
in implementing the Kyoto Protocol. Finally, because the Kyoto Protocol clearly shows that
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 Kyoto Protocol, Article 2.3.
30
 Article 4.8.
31
 See Article 2(a).
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binding commitments for developing countries are further into the future, they have not been
included either.
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 5XOHVIRUGLVWULEXWLRQRIEXUGHQDPRQJ2(&'
FRXQWULHV
This section explores different kinds of burden sharing rules and formulae. Our intention is to
explore how different types of formulae distribute climate policy targets and national income
losses across the OECD. The results indicate which national circumstances are important
when a country’s share of emission reduction is determined by specific burden sharing
formulae.
While a number of equity principles were discussed in the previous section, this section is
mainly concerned with horizontal equity. There are two reasons for choosing this outcome-
based equity principle. First, countries opposing uniform measures and measures applied
across-the-board stress the importance of horizontal equity. Second, the principle is implicitly
adopted by the FCCC and the Berlin Mandate.
7DEOH'DWDRQ2(&'FRXQWULHVH[FHSW,FHODQG&]HFK5HSXEOLF+XQJDU\.RUHD
0H[LFRDQG3RODQG
&2
HPLVVLRQV
HQHUJ\
UHODWHG
PLOOWRQV
*'3
ELOO
86'
3RSX
ODWLRQ
LQ
&2
HPLVVLRQV*'3
LQNJ&2
86'
*'3
FDSLWD
86'
&2
HPLVVLRQV
SHUFDSLWD
WRQV
Australia 283 309.3 17840 915 17337 15.9
Austria 57 166 7990 343 20776 7.1
Belgium 113 196.8 10010 574 19660 11.3
Canada 443 573.8 29100 770 19718 15.2
Denmark 59 134 5200 440 25769 11.3
Finland 55 118.3 5090 470 23242 10.8
France 368 1205 57960 310 20790 6.3
Germany 897 1718 81410 520 21103 11.0
Greece 74 69 10350 1072 6667 7.1
Ireland 33 50 3560 660 14045 9.3
Italy 408 1109 57100 368 19422 7.1
Japan 1091 3094 124960 350 24760 8.7
Luxem-
bourg
11 11 380 1000 28947 28.9
Netherlands 171 294.6 15400 580 19130 11.1
New
Zealand
28 47 3460 596 13584 8.1
Norway 32 114.5 4337 280 26401 7.4
Portugal 46 69 9860 667 6998 4.7
Spain 223 500.9 39140 440 12798 5.7
Sweden 52 218.2 8770 240 24880 5.9
Switzerland 43.2 223.3 6940 190 32175 6.9
Turkey 150 173 59490 867 2908 2.5
UK 558 971 58375 580 16634 9.6
USA 5095 5765 260730 880 22111 19.5
Sources: OECD (1995a); OECD (1995b).
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Three burden sharing rules or formulae are explored. It is assumed that the overall level of
abatement remains 20% of total 1993 OECD emissions. This target can be interpreted as a
20% reduction compared to ‘business as usual’ emissions of a future target year, like 2010. It
is estimated, first, how each formula would distribute emission reductions across OECD
countries and, second, how much individual countries would need to reduce in order to
contribute their share of the total amount of emissions reduced by the OECD. Third, it is
calculated how costly the three formulae would be for individual countries and, fourth, the
total OECD cost is calculated.
All OECD countries (except Iceland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, Mexico and
Poland) are examined.32 For absolute and relative figures on population, GDP and CO2
emissions in OECD countries, see Table 2 and Table 3, respectively. 33
7DEOH&2HPLVVLRQVSRSXODWLRQDQG*'3DVSHUFHQWDJHRI2(&'WRWDOH[FHSW
,FHODQG&]HFK5HSXEOLF+XQJDU\.RUHD0H[LFRDQG3RODQG
&2HPLVVLRQV *'3 3RSXODWLRQ
Australia 2.8 1.8 2.0
Austria 0.6 1.0 0.9
Belgium 1.1 1.1 1.1
Canada 4.3 3.3 3.3
Denmark 0.6 0.8 0.6
Finland 0.5 0.7 0.6
France 3.6 7.0 6.6
Germany 8.7 10.0 9.3
Greece 0.7 0.4 1.2
Ireland 0.3 0.3 0.4
Italy 4.0 6.5 6.5
Japan 10.6 18.1 14.2
Luxembourg 0.1 0.1 0.04
Netherlands 1.7 1.7 1.8
New Zealand 0.3 0.3 0.4
Norway 0.3 0.7 0.5
Portugal 0.4 0.4 1.1
Spain 2.2 2.9 4.5
Sweden 0.5 1.3 1.0
Switzerland 0.4 1.3 0.8
Turkey 1.5 1.0 6.8
UK 5.4 5.7 6.7
USA 49.5 33.7 29.7
Sources: OECD (1995a); OECD (1995b).
The allocations of emission reduction commitments that follow from implementation of
Formula I, II and III will imply a certain distribution of national income losses. A numerical
                                                
32
 It has not been possible to obtain comparable data for Iceland. The Czech Republic, Korea and Mexico are not
included since they have only recently become members of the OECD and are not included in the Annex I group
of countries. However, Czechoslovakia is included in the Annex I group. The OECD members Hungary and
Poland are not included since they are EIT countries.
33
 The most recent data from 1993 have been used.
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model is used to estimate how Formula I, II and III would distribute these losses across OECD
countries as well as the resulting level of cost-effectiveness within the OECD.34
To compare the formulae and the resultant cost distributions, the national income changes
following a 20% reduction in each OECD country are included as a reference case (see Figure
1). This case is rather similar to the policy proposal made by the German delegation in the
spring of 1996.35 The income loss for the OECD is 0.21% of GDP if each country cuts its
emissions with 20%.
In the following, three figures illustrate the emission reductions as percentage of national
emissions based on the formulae. The detailed emission reductions are presented in Annex A
as a percentage of OECD total emissions and as a percentage of national emissions. The
corresponding national income changes are presented in the three remaining figures and in
Annex B.
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34
 See Holtsmark (1997). The model analyzes to what extent resource rents are transferred from fossil fuel
exporting countries to fossil fuel importing countries when governments take into account benefits from revenue
recycling. Furthermore the structure of the countries’ energy demand, prior tax distortions, and the size of the
marginal excess burden of taxation in the different countries are important for the model’s estimates of the
simultaneous national income losses. A game theoretic approach is used to analyze how countries’ policy choices
are interdependently linked to the markets for oil, coal and natural gas. Each OECD country is incorporated into
the model by national welfare functions. The indicators in these functions are the fossil fuel taxes, the production
and consumption of fossil fuels, and the amount of public revenue generated by fossil fuel taxation.
35
 Germany proposed a 10% reduction in CO2 emissions by the year 2005, and a 15-20% reduction by the year
2010, both against the base year of 1990. Statement by Cornelia Quennet-Thielen, German Delegation. 6 March
1996.
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 )RUPXOD,
Formula I is based on the premise that a country which is identical to the average OECD
country, so to speak, should reduce its emissions by exactly 20%.36 A country that exceeds the
OECD average with respect to one or more of four indicators should reduce its emissions with
more than 20%. Similarly, if a country is below the OECD average with respect to one or
more of the indicators its target will be below 20%.
Formula I’s four indicators are CO2 emissions per capita, GDP, CO2 emissions per unit of
GDP and GDP per capita. These are understood as indicators for emission entitlements, size
of countries (the size of economies of countries), energy efficiency, and ability to pay. Each
indicator is given a certain weight, and the sum of the weights is 100. The indicators are listed
in Table 2.
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)LJXUH)RUPXOD,(PLVVLRQUHGXFWLRQDVSHUFHQWDJHRIQDWLRQDO&2HPLVVLRQV
2(&'UHGXFWLRQRIOHYHO
                                                
36
 The formula is: Yi = {wA Ai/A + wB Bi/B + wC Ci/C + wD Di/D} Z, where Yi is the percentage emission
reduction target for country i. Ai is emissions per capita for country i, Bi is GDP for country i, Ci is emissions per
unit of GDP for country i, and Di is GDP per capita for country i. A, B, C and D represent OECD averages for
the same indicators. The weights for the indicators are represented by the w-weights, and where the sum wA+ wB
+ wC + wD = 100. Z is a scaling factor which is determined so as to make the total emissions abatement for
OECD equal to 20% (Z varies between 0,0965 and 0,1218 in different cases).
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Four ways to distribute weights on the indicators, referred to as Case 1, 2, 3, and 4, are
calculated.37 The base case gives equal weight, namely 25, to the four indicators. In each of
the three other cases an additional weight of 55 or 70 is given to one indicator, and the other
three indicators have weights of either 10 or 15. In Figure 2, the results of Formula I are
presented as percentage reduction in each country’s emissions.
To achieve the 20% reduction in total OECD emissions, as Figure 2 shows, the United States
reduces its present emissions from between 27% to 29% and Japan reduces from between
15% to 20%. Furthermore, Luxembourg reduces from between 14% to almost 18%, Germany
13-15%, and Canada 11-14%.
It is evident that putting different weights on the indicators results in considerable differences
in the amount of emissions reduced by countries. In Case 1, the United States reduces its
emission with 29%, Japan reduces its emission with about 16%, and Germany and
Luxembourg reduce their emission with 13% and 14%, respectively. In this case most
countries, except United States, reduce at a relatively low level compared to Case 2, 3 and 4.
Case 2 puts more emphasis on countries’ emission per capita and, as a consequence, the
United States reduces about 27% of its emissions, Japan reduces almost 20%, and Germany,
Luxembourg, and Switzerland reduce slightly above 15%.
For the majority of wealthy European countries and Japan, Case 2 results in considerable
emission reductions relative to Case 1, 3 and 4, while the United States reduces less. Case 3
puts emphasis on energy efficiency as measured by how much a country emits relative to the
size of the economy. Case 3 results in considerable reductions in relatively poor countries
such as Turkey, Greece, Portugal and Ireland, but also in Australia, Canada and New Zealand,
and in Luxembourg. Case 4 results in larger emission reductions in countries with high GDP
per capita, and therefore with more ability to pay, and results in relatively larger reductions in
relatively wealthy European countries and in Japan, but less reductions in the United States.
The United States reduces its emissions by 27%, and Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Canada
reduce their emissions between 11% and 12%.
Returning to the issue of horizontal equity, it could be argued that Case 3 is unfair to relatively
poor countries, and that Case 1 and 4 are favorable to most European countries, but unfair to
the United States. Of these four cases of Formula I, therefore, Case 2 represents the most
equitable distribution of emission reductions across OECD countries. Consequently, the cost
implications of Case 2, which implies that the United States reduces slightly less while almost
all other relatively wealthy OECD countries reduce more, are estimated.
In Figure 3 Norway, the United States, Sweden, Canada, Switzerland and Australia experience
the largest national income loss in percentage of GDP. The national income loss of the United
States is explained by its large emission reduction. The large national income loss of Sweden
and to some extent Norway is related to the high taxes on fossil fuels in these countries in the
                                                
37
 Case 1: 25*(CO2/pop.+GDP+CO2/GDP+GDP/pop.);
Case 2: 55*CO2/pop.+15*(GDP+CO2/GDP+GDP/pop.);
Case 3: 55*CO2/GDP+15*(CO2/pop.+GDP+GDP/pop.);
Case 4: 70*GDP/pop.+10*(CO2/pop.+GDP+CO2/GDP).
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)LJXUH1DWLRQDOLQFRPHFKDQJHVLQSHUFHQWDJHRI*'3IURPLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI
)RUPXOD,
reference situation which result in high marginal abatement costs. The Norwegian national
income loss is also related to a price drop of 7.3% in the European natural gas market.38
Canada’s national income loss is almost as big as the national income loss of the United
States, in spite of the fact that Canada reduces much less than the United States.
This result must be seen in relation to those two countries’ role in the fossil fuel markets,
especially the North American gas market. The United States is assumed to impose taxes on
natural gas consumption of 31 USD/ton CO2 in this scenario and the producer price of natural
gas drops by 27.1% in the North American gas market. This causes a national income loss to
Canada as the net gas exporter in the North American gas market.
Significantly, the model simulation shows that a number of countries will experience net
national income gains from the implementation of this type of burden sharing formula,
especially Germany receives large net gains.
The total income loss amounts to 0.19% of the total GDP of the OECD area. Hence, Formula
I is more cost-effective than the reference case’s uniform reductions resulting in a total
income loss of 0.21%. This is mainly due to the large reductions in USA which, according to
the model, has relatively low marginal abatement costs.
                                                
38
 The oil price is almost unchanged in this scenario and this explains the relatively small national income loss of
Norway. This result is based on the assumption that OECD countries introduce efficient taxation of fossil fuels
which means reduced taxes on oil products in several countries.
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 )RUPXOD,,
Formula II is based on each OECD country’s percentage share of population, CO2 emissions
and GDP of the OECD total. For the indicators used in Formula II, see Table 3. Again,
weights are given to each of the three indicators.39 Case 1 puts equal weight on the three
indicators, but the other three cases give low weight to population.40 Case 2 puts more weight
on CO2 emissions, and Case 3 increases the weight on CO2 emissions even more, but reduces
the weight on GDP. Case 4 puts relatively more weight on GDP and less weight on emissions.
Figure 4 shows the reductions in the OECD countries’ emissions that follow from
implementing Formula II where the overall target is to reduce 20% of 1993 total OECD
emissions. Again, it is evident that putting different weights on the indicators results in
considerable differences in the amount of emissions that countries reduce. In Case 1, the
biggest cuts are made by countries with large populations and modest emissions, and in
relatively rich and energy-efficient countries. Case 1 results in very high reductions in Turkey,
and Austria reduces with 29%, France 32%, Italy 29%, Japan 27%, New Zealand 23%,
Norway 32%, Spain 29%, Sweden 37% and Switzerland 40%. However, it results in relatively
less reduction in the United States, Australia, Canada, and Luxembourg, by 15%, 16%, 17%,
and 13%, respectively.
In Case 2 the differences in how much countries reduce emissions generally are smaller.
Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom all reduce at a level higher than
the average 20%, whereas Australia, Canada, Luxembourg and the United States reduce below
20%. Some of the relatively poor OECD countries also reduce below 20%.
Case 3 further increases the weight on emissions compared to Case 2. Australia, Canada,
Luxembourg and the United States, as well as Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Turkey, increase
their reductions some. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom reduce less than
in Case 2.
In Case 4, relatively wealthy and energy-efficient countries cut their emissions most. Case 4
implies considerable reductions in Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy and Japan, and
especially in France, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. Smaller reductions are made in
Australia, Canada, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, Turkey and the United States.
When comparing these four cases, it could be argued that Case 3 is most fair as it results in
the most equal percentage distribution of emission reductions across OECD countries. Case 1
and 4 result in relatively high emission reductions in some countries and similarly low
                                                
39
 The formula is Xi = {wE Ei + wF Fi + wG Gi}. Xi is the percentage share of country i of the total emission
reduction commitment for OECD. Ei is the percentage population share of country i, Fi is the percentage CO2
emission share of country i, and Gi is the percentage GDP share of country i. The sum of the w-weights is equal
to 1.
40
 Case 1:1/3*(CO2+pop+GDP);
Case 2: 0,05*pop+0,6*CO2+0,35*GDP;
Case 3:0,05*pop+0,8*CO2+0,15*GDP;
Case 4: 0,05*pop+0,35*CO2+0,6*GDP.
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)LJXUH)RUPXOD,,(PLVVLRQUHGXFWLRQDVSHUFHQWDJHRIQDWLRQDO&2HPLVVLRQV
2(&'UHGXFWLRQRIOHYHO
emission reductions in others. Case 3 results in a more equal distribution of percentages
relative to Case 2. Because Case 3 best conforms with the horizontal equity principle, the
implications of this case with respect to national income levels are calculated.
Relative to Formula I, Formula II gives rise to quite different quantitative emission reduction
commitments. This is reflected in the changes in national income levels that follow from the
implementation of the commitments (see Figure 5). First of all, it is noteworthy that Formula
II produces a less cost-effective solution compared to Formula I; the total income loss for the
OECD is 0.23% of GDP, as compared to 0.19% in Formula I, and 0.21% in the reference
case. This is because Formula II shifts some emission reductions from USA to especially
France, Italy, Sweden, Norway and Japan. The result is a transfer of commitments from a
country with low marginal abatement costs, such as the United States, to countries with
substantially higher abatement costs, such as Norway and Sweden. At the same time, the
bigger reduction commitment for Germany results in a larger amount of relatively low-cost
reductions being realized.
To conclude, under Formula II, Norway, Sweden, Italy and Switzerland are committed to
reduce their emissions by a higher percentage than the OECD average and their national
income losses consequently are high. This formula could be said to have relatively unfair
burden sharing consequences when judged against the principle of horizontal equity. In
addition, it is less cost-effective. However, Formula II could to some extent satisfy the
principle of vertical equity since most of these countries have high GDP per capita and
therefore a higher capacity to pay (see Table 2).
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 )RUPXOD,,,
Formula III includes GDP, emissions per unit of GDP, and GDP per capita. Apart from CO2
per capita, the same indicators were included in Formula I. Weights that sum up to 100 are
given to each indicator. The weighted sum of the indicators is calculated for each country and
it is divided by the sum over all OECD countries.41 In this way the percentage share of the
OECD total is calculated for each country. In Case 1, the three weights are equal to 33,3.42
The other cases put more weight, either 60 or 80, on one of the indicators, and the weights on
the other indicators are either 20 or 10. The implications of the 20% reduction of total OECD
emissions target are presented as percentage reduction in each country’s emissions, see Figure
6.
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)LJXUH)RUPXOD,,,(PLVVLRQUHGXFWLRQDVSHUFHQWDJHRIQDWLRQDO&2HPLVVLRQV
2(&'UHGXFWLRQRIOHYHO
Emission reduction for Luxembourg as a percentage of national emissions: Case 1: 139%, Case 3: 187%,
Case 4: 296%.
                                                
41
 The formula is Vi = {wB Bi + wC Ci + wd Di}/ S j {wB Bj + wC Cj + wd Dj}. Vi is the percentage share of country
i of the total emission reduction commitment of OECD. Bi is GDP for country i, Ci is emissions per unit of GDP
for country i, and Di is GDP per capita for country i. The w’s are weights that sum up to 100. The divisor
represents the sum over all OECD countries. Due to the different units of the indicators the scale of the data is
adjusted so as to make the range (i.e. the lowest value up to the highest value found for different countries)
comparable across the indicators. One example of this is that the GDP figures are divided by 100.000 since they
are much larger than the other indicators.
42
 Case 1: 33,3*(GDP+CO2/GDP+GDP/pop.);
Case 2: 10*(GDP/pop.+CO2/GDP)+80*GDP;
Case 3: 20*(GDP+CO2/GDP)+60*GDP/pop.;
Case 4: 20*(GDP+GDP/pop.)+60*CO2/GDP.
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Figure 6 shows that Sweden reduces between 51% and 64% of its emissions, Norway between
45% and 72%, Austria between 36 and 49%, and France reduces between 34% and 39%.
Because of its exceptionally high emissions per GDP and CO2 emissions per capita,
Luxembourg reduces its emissions between 29% and 296%! Italy and Japan reduce their
emissions with more than 28%, and Denmark and Finland also make substantial reductions.
However, Australia, Canada, and the United States reduce less than 20% of their emissions.
The distribution of emission reductions in Formula III is entirely different from the
distribution in Formula I and II. This is also reflected in the resulting national income losses
(see Figure 7). Sweden, Switzerland, Norway and Italy experience income losses far above the
average. This is basically a result of the large emission reduction commitments for those
countries, but it reflects also the large marginal abatement costs in these countries.
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With regard to cost-effectiveness Formula III results in a burden sharing arrangement with
large total income loss; the total loss is 0.34% of GDP for the OECD area. In comparison, the
income losses of Formula I and II were 0.19% and 0.23%, respectively. The high costs follow
from the large commitments of some of the Nordic countries, Italy, Japan, Switzerland and
France, where abatement costs usually are high, whereas the emission reductions are small in
USA, Canada and Australia where the abatement costs are low.
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 'LVFXVVLRQDQGILQGLQJV
This article has explored three formulae for distribution of commitments to reduce GHG
emissions among OECD countries. These formulae are more complex than simple burden
sharing rules, for example per capita targets or equal percentage reductions. Various indicators
or criteria corresponding to prominent equity principles were chosen and the overall
distribution of national income losses across OECD were compared against the horizontal
equity principle.
Their sensitivity was examined by varying the weights given to the indicators in the formulae.
The formulae determine how OECD countries would share the burden of emission reduction
and how much individual countries would reduce present emissions. A numerical model
estimated national income changes for each OECD country. Such formulae could also be used
as a basis for the initial distribution of tradable permits within a group of countries, for
example the EU.
As should be expected, the article shows that percentage distributions of commitments to
reduce emissions inadequately indicate the corresponding distribution of national income
losses. The three formulae distribute national income changes very differently. Formula I
results in a welfare loss of 0.7% of GDP in Norway, and Canada, Sweden and the United
States loose between 0.3% and 0.4% of GDP. Australia and Switzerland experience a loss of
about 0.2% of GDP. Importantly, a number of countries will experience net national income
gains from the implementation of Formula I, especially Germany. Also important, compared
to the reference case in which each OECD country reduces its CO2 emissions with 20%,
Formula I results in smaller national income losses for all countries, except the United States.
As a consequence of Formula II, Norway and Sweden each experience a loss of about 1% of
GDP, and Canada, Denmark, Italy and Switzerland loose between 0.4 and 0.6% of GDP. No
country receives a net welfare gain under Formula II, and the formula is less cost-effective
than the reference case. Compared to Formula I, Formula II is more economically burdensome
on all countries except the United States. Under Formula III, the income loss of Norway,
Sweden and Switzerland is 2% or more, and a significant number of countries have greater
losses than under Formula II. Formula III would also be less cost-effective than the reference
case. These cost estimations are of course sensitive to the economic model used.
None of the three formulae produced a burden sharing arrangement that completely equalized
the economic costs across the OECD. In other words, Formula I, II and III could not satisfy
the principle of horizontal equity among OECD countries implicitly adopted in the Kyoto
Protocol and the FCCC. That said, many countries would probably find Formula I to be more
economically attractive than the reference case. It is possible, moreover, that these formulae
could be adjusted so as to produce more equitable results, or that more equitable formulae
could be developed.
The analysis raises, in addition, important issues about how rules and formulae might best
facilitate target differentiation. On the one hand, burden sharing rules seem an useful tool in
negotiations among countries as they might create new insight into the numerous ways in
which it is possible to allocate costs among countries and into underlying economic and social
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drivers of global climate change. It also seems plausible that governments by analyzing and
negotiating burden sharing rules increase their understanding of the applicability of various
concepts of fairness in devising equitable solutions. Raising the issue of burden sharing rules
might therefore lead governments toward agreement on particular concepts of fairness and
how these could be incorporated into future climate target negotiations.
On the other hand, as the Kyoto negotiations showed, it is unlikely that climate target
negotiations will be narrowly focused on any particular rule. In fact, it might be more difficult
to obtain agreement on guiding fairness principles than to actually differentiate targets. It will
also be important not to focus too narrowly on particular burden sharing rules reducing
climate target negotiations to a ‘numbers game’. Undoubtedly, economic considerations and
other factors, for example domestic political conditions and foreign policy goals, will also
influence climate target negotiations, and formulae will not be able to incorporate these
systematically.
It will be difficult, although not impossible, to develop politically acceptable formulae and
rules. A rule that is able to reflect changes in countries’ ability to pay, population changes, and
technology and energy efficiency developments would be attractive. On the other hand, a
simple and robust burden sharing rule, or at least a burden sharing principle, would be more
administratively and politically feasible. It seems clear that equity, opportunities for cost-
effectiveness and flexibility are among the main criteria which a burden sharing rule need to
satisfy.
The Triptych approach followed by the EU is an interesting framework in this context, since
the burden sharing is based on structural characteristics in three main economic sectors and
sector-wise differences across the EU member states.43 At the cost of more data requirements,
such a framework provides a higher flexibility to consider important structural characteristics
across countries. Again, it must be emphasized that burden sharing rules can be useful
conceptual tools and as such might provide some, but not all, of the conceptual framework for
climate protocol negotiations. They should be understood as a tool to develop the starting
points, rather than end-points, of differentiation processes.
Finally, the larger and more diversified the group of countries, the more complicated it will be
to differentiate. Compared to OECD agreements, negotiating differentiated climate
agreements among developed and developing countries will be more complex. Developing
countries tend to focus on historical GHG emissions and on adverse effects of climate change
in developing countries (e.g. flooding of coastal areas or crop losses in agriculture due to
reduced precipitation). The first issue raises the question of the responsibility for historical
cumulative emissions of GHGs, while the second raises the issue of assistance from
developed to developing countries. These issues will create a complex challenge in future
negotiations on binding climate commitments for developing countries.
                                                
43
 For an analysis, see Ringius (1997).
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(PLVVLRQUHGXFWLRQDVDSHUFHQWDJHRI2(&'WRWDOUHGXFWLRQ
Cases: Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Japan Luxemb. Netherl. N. Zeal. Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerl. Turkey UK USA
1: equal weights 1.4 0.2 0.4 2.3 0.2 0.2 1.6 5.5 0.2 0.1 1.8 8.7 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.4 2.6 72.4
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(PLVVLRQUHGXFWLRQDVSHUFHQWDJHRIQDWLRQDOHPLVVLRQV
Cases: Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Japan Luxemb. Netherl. N. Zeal. Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerl. Turkey UK USA
1: equal weights 10.1 6.0 7.7 10.5 7.7 7.4 9.1 12.6 6.8 6.5 9.0 16.4 13.6 7.9 5.9 6.3 4.7 6.2 6.0 6.9 4.9 9.5 29.2
2: extra weight on CO2/pop. 11.1 10.5 10.8 12.4 12.9 11.9 13.0 15.1 6.3 8.3 12.4 19.6 15.7 10.9 7.9 12.7 5.3 8.2 12.1 15.2 4.3 11.4 26.7
3: extra weight on CO2/GDP 14.5 7.0 10.1 13.7 9.1 9.0 9.0 13.2 13.3 9.8 9.4 14.7 17.7 10.3 8.9 6.8 8.6 7.9 6.2 6.5 10.4 11.5 28.1
4: extra weight on GDP/pop. 11.8 9.6 10.6 12.7 12.1 11.2 11.9 14.6 6.7 8.3 11.5 18.3 17.3 10.6 7.7 11.2 5.3 7.7 10.6 13.1 4.4 11.2 27.2
)2508/$
(PLVVLRQUHGXFWLRQDVDSHUFHQWDJHRI2(&'WRWDOUHGXFWLRQ
Cases: Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Japan Luxemb. Netherl. N. Zeal. Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerl. Turkey UK USA
1: equal weights 2.2 0.8 1.1 3.7 0.6 0.6 5.7 9.3 0.8 0.3 5.6 14.3 0.1 1.7 0.3 0.5 0.7 3.2 0.9 0.8 3.1 5.9 37.6
2: extra weight on emissions 2.4 0.7 1.1 3.9 0.6 0.6 4.9 9.2 0.6 0.3 5.0 13.4 0.1 1.7 0.3 0.4 0.5 2.5 0.8 0.7 1.6 5.6 43.0
3: even more weight on emiss. 2.6 0.6 1.1 4.1 0.6 0.6 4.2 8.9 0.7 0.3 4.5 11.9 0.1 1.7 0.3 0.4 0.5 2.4 0.6 0.6 1.7 5.5 46.1
4: extra weight on GDP 2.1 0.8 1.1 3.7 0.7 0.6 5.8 9.5 0.6 0.3 5.6 15.3 0.1 1.7 0.3 0.5 0.5 2.7 1.0 1.0 1.5 5.6 39.0
(PLVVLRQUHGXFWLRQDVSHUFHQWDJHRIQDWLRQDOHPLVVLRQV
Cases: Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Japan Luxemb. Netherl. N. Zeal. Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerl. Turkey UK USA
1: equal weights 16.0 29.3 20.6 17.0 22.7 22.5 32.1 21.4 21.3 21.2 28.5 27.0 13.4 20.6 23.0 31.6 29.4 29.4 36.7 39.9 42.3 21.8 15.2
2: extra weight on emissions 17.3 25.9 20.4 18.2 22.6 22.1 27.6 21.1 17.6 19.6 25.1 25.3 16.6 20.3 20.5 28.6 20.8 23.5 31.6 35.6 21.5 20.5 17.4
3: even more weight on emiss. 18.7 22.9 20.2 19.1 21.1 21.0 23.7 20.5 19.3 20.0 22.5 22.5 18.2 20.2 20.5 24.0 21.2 22.1 25.5 27.2 22.7 20.4 18.6
4: extra weight on GDP 15.6 29.6 20.6 17.1 24.4 23.6 32.5 21.9 15.4 19.2 28.2 28.8 14.6 20.5 20.5 34.4 20.3 25.2 39.2 46.1 20.0 20.8 15.8
)2508/$
(PLVVLRQUHGXFWLRQDVDSHUFHQWDJHRI2(&'WRWDOUHGXFWLRQ
Cases: Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Japan Luxemb. Netherl. N. Zeal. Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerl. Turkey UK USA
1: equal weights 2.2 1.2 1.5 3.6 1.1 1.0 6.7 9.5 1.0 0.7 6.2 16.7 0.7 2.0 0.6 0.9 0.8 3.0 1.4 1.5 1.4 5.5 31.1
2: extra weight on GDP 1.9 1.0 1.2 3.4 0.8 0.7 7.0 10.0 0.5 0.3 6.4 17.9 0.2 1.8 0.3 0.7 0.5 2.9 1.3 1.3 1.1 5.7 33.3
3: extra weight on GDP/pop. 2.3 1.3 1.6 3.6 1.3 1.2 6.6 9.3 1.0 0.8 6.1 16.2 1.0 2.1 0.7 1.1 0.8 3.0 1.6 1.7 1.4 5.5 30.0
4:extra weight on  emiss./GDP 2.8 1.3 1.8 3.8 1.4 1.3 6.1 8.8 1.8 1.2 5.8 15.0 1.6 2.3 1.1 1.0 1.3 3.0 1.5 1.5 2.0 5.4 28.1
(PLVVLRQUHGXFWLRQDVSHUFHQWDJHRIQDWLRQDOHPLVVLRQV
Cases: Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Japan Luxemb. Netherl. N. Zeal. Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerl. Turkey UK USA
1: equal weights 16.1 42.3 26.4 16.5 37.6 37.4 37.2 21.8 26.9 43.0 31.1 31.5 138.7 23.7 46.8 57.5 33.8 27.3 56.0 69.3 19.1 20.4 12.6
2: extra weight on GDP 13.5 36.0 21.7 15.7 28.7 27.4 39.1 22.8 13.3 21.6 32.4 33.7 29.2 21.1 23.8 45.0 20.2 27.0 51.2 63.1 14.6 20.8 13.5
3: extra weight on GDP/pop. 16.7 48.0 28.9 16.7 45.1 44.5 36.7 21.3 27.6 49.9 30.7 30.6 187.3 25.0 54.8 72.2 35.5 27.2 63.5 81.7 18.6 20.1 12.1
4: extra weight on emiss./GDP 20.3 48.7 32.9 17.8 47.3 49.2 34.3 20.2 51.4 76.0 29.1 28.3 295.8 27.3 81.8 67.3 57.4 27.7 58.0 69.2 27.8 19.9 11.4
&,&(52:RUNLQJ3DSHU
Can multi-criteria rules fairly distribute climate burdens? OECD results from three burden sharing rules
34
$QQH[%
National income changes as percentage of GDP from the three burden sharing
formulae.
Country Formula I Formula II Formula III
Australia -0,22 -0,33 -0,25
Austria 0,01 -0,15 -0,46
Belgium 0,02 -0,16 -0,19
Canada -0,31 -0,44 -0,34
Denmark -0,19 -0,47 -0,81
Finland -0,01 -0,21 -0,40
France -0,02 -0,23 -0,68
Germany 0,06 -0,01 -0,04
Greece 0,03 -0,17 -0,06
Ireland 0,04 -0,14 -0,16
Italy -0,12 -0,58 -1,13
Japan -0,16 -0,23 -0,51
Luxembourg -0,05 -0,12 -0,52
Netherlands -0,03 -0,35 -0,48
New Zealand -0,05 -0,20 -0,22
Norway -0,67 -1,03 -2,11
Portugal 0,04 -0,18 -0,16
Spain 0,03 -0,13 -0,21
Sweden -0,33 -0,96 -2,57
Switzerland -0,21 -0,54 -2,02
Turkey 0,04 -0,16 -0,04
UK -0,02 -0,13 -0,14
USA -0,37 -0,19 -0,09
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